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440 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
courts concur, however, that determining admiralty jurisdiction on the
basis of locality alone is inconsistent with the purpose of the jurisdictional
grant . '
The Fourth Circuit holding in Moore is consistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Executive Jet 6 and is in harmony with the purpose
behind the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction. 7 The framers of
the jurisdictional grant in the Constitution, recognizing that conflicting
and changing state laws would detract from the smooth flow of interstate
and international maritime commerce, 8 sought to protect the domestic
shipping industry through the development and application of a uniform
and specialized body of law by neutral federal courts. 9 Before Executive
Jet, some courts sustained admiralty jurisdiction in cases that bore no
relationship to the type of activity that the jurisdictional grant was created
to serve.6" In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court recognized this divergence
from the framer's intent and required that the wrong bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.8 The Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Moore reflects the Executive Jet philosophy.
ScoTT A. STOREY
II. BANKRUPTCY
One of the primary objectives of the law of bankruptcy is to provide a
method of collecting a debtor's assets so that they may be used to satisfy
mishap on dam-obstructed water lacks relationship to maritime commerce) with Kelly v.
United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1975) (failure of United States Coast Guard to rescue
drowning victim whose sailboat had capsized; relationship held to exist); St. Hilaire Moye
v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1975) (boating accident on Arkansas River held to fulfill
maritime nexus requirement); and Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973) (boat-to-shore
gun battle on Mississippi River held to fulfill requirement of maritime relationship).
I' See note 53 supra. The disunity is especially notable in the area of pleasure boat torts.
See Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Pleasure Craft Torts, 36 MD. L. REV. 212 (1976);
Comment, Torts On Inland Waters-Admiralty Jurisdiction, 39 Mo. L. REV. 28 (1974); Note,
Pleasure Boat Torts In Admiralty Jurisdiction: Satisfying The Maritime Nexus Standard, 34
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 121 (1977).
1: E.g., Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1975); Adams v. Montana
Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973,
976 (8th Cir. 1974); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1973).
"' See note 7 supra.
See text accompanying note 5 supra.
a Putnam, supra note 1, at 469; 48 IND. L. J. 87, 87-88 (1972).
"' Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975); Crosson v. Vance,
484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973); Deutsch, supra note 3, at 118; 48 IND. L.J. 87, 87-88 (1972).
'" Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 255-66 (1972), citing,
Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (injury to swimmer
by surfboard); King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.Tenn. 1963) (injury to water skier).
1 409 U.S. at 268.
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the claims of creditors.' When bankruptcy is initiated the assets of the
debtor immediately come within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
and vest in the possession and control of the bankruptcy trustee upon his
appointment.3 The trustee's duty is to collect the assets of the debtor's
estate4 and liquidate them as quickly as possible.- The trustee distributes
these proceeds to.the creditors and closes up the debtor's estate.6
A recent Fourth Circuit decision involved the distribution of the assets
of a debtor's estate. Jackson Park Realty Co. v. Williams (In re O'Neill
Enterprises)7 dealt with whether an insurance policy was abandoned by the
bankruptcy trustee during the distribution of the assets of the estate. The
Fourth Circuit held that the insurance policy owned by the corporate
debtor was not abandoned property, but remained under the control of the
bankruptcy trustee.
O'Neill Enterprises had entered into a loan agreement with its finan-
ciers, Fidelity Bankers Life Insurance Co. and Philadelphia Life Insurance
I Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930); see Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co.,
299 U.S. 445, 452 (1937); 4A W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.42 (14th ed. 1976)[hereinafter
cited as COLLIER]; J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 18
(1956)[hereinafter cited as MAcLACHLAN]; FULLERTON, Katchen v. Landy-Its Practical
Signifance, 27 FED. B. J. 140 (1967); Note, Abandonment of Assets by a Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 415, 426 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Abandonment].
2 A straight bankruptcy case is commenced with filing a petition in the appropriate
court. FED. BANKR. R. 101. The filing under Bankruptcy Rule 103 may be a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy by any person seeking the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act, or an involuntary
petition by the creditors of a person owing more than $1,000 under Bankruptcy Rule 104.
Bankruptcy Act § 4a, b, 11 U.S.C. § 22(a), (b) (1970); see Bankruptcy Act § 3b, 11 U.S.C. §
21(b) (1970). See generally MACLACHLAN, supra note 1, at §§ 34-51.
3 Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970) provides: "[t]he trustee of the estate
of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and
qualification, shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of
the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title ..... See Isaacs
v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737 (1931); FED. BANKR. R. 218(1); 4A COLLIER,
supra note 1, at 70.05; MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 1, at § 169.
Assets of the bankrupt include all of the real and personal property, debts, and causes
of action involving property and contract owned by the bankrupt. Wilson v. National Bank,
3 F. 391, 393 (W.D. Mo. 1880) quoting REv. ST. § 5067; see Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co.,
525 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1975)(bankrupt's estate includes causes of action); Feldman v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Pa. 1976)(bankrupt's estate includes personal prop-
erty); .In re Polumbo, 271 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Va. 1967)(bankrupt's estate includes real
property). Life insurance policies that are not exempt from bankruptcy proceedings under
state law and payable to the bankrupt are assets of the bankrupt's estate. As such, the policies
pass to the trustee for administration. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Wemyss, 309 F.Supp.
1221 (D. Me. 1970); Joslin, Life Insurance in Bankruptcy: A Review, 76 CoM. L. J. 59 (1971);
see D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 149 (1973) [hereinafter cited as EPsTms]; cf. In re
Insulation & Accoustical Specialities, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Mo. 1969), afl'd, 426 F.2d
1189 (8th Cir. 1970) (policy on life of president of bankrupt corporation is asset of bankrupt's
estate).
5 Bankruptcy Act § 47, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1970); MAcLACHLAN, supra note 1, at § 127. See
generally MacLachlan, Protection and Collection of Property of Bankrupt Estates, 39 MINN.
L. REv. 626 (1955).
Bankruptcy Act § 2a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1970).
547 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1977).
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Co.' The financiers received as security for the loan a first deed of trust
on real estate owned by O'Neill Enterprises, and an assignment of rents
from the real estate conditioned on default on the loan payments. The
financiers received as additional collateral, life insurance policies in the
amount of $1,000,000.10 Approximately five years after the original loan
agreement, O'Neill Enterprises was declared bankrupt after an involun-
tary petition in bankruptcy was filed by its creditors." The insurance
policies were listed as assets of the bankrupt on the asset schedule' 2 with
the note that they were thought to have no cash surrender value.'3 After
the bankruptcy petition had been filed, Fidelity and Philadelphia surren-
dered the policies to the issuers and collected their cash value'4 without the
knowledge of the bankruptcy trustee. The trustee abandoned the real es-
tate secured by the insurance policies'" after an effort to sell the real estate
failed to bring a bid sufficient to produce any equity for the estate.'"
I O'Neill Enterprises received a $750,000 loan from Fidelity and Philadelphia for which
it executed two $375,000 notes. The loan was used to finance construction of a building in
Charlottesville, Virginia. Id. at 813.
1 O'Neill Enterprises later executed a second deed of trust on the same property to secure
a $100,000 loan by Jackson Park Realty Co. Id.
,0 The $1,000,000 in life insurance policies insured the lives of Frank A. O'Neill, the
president and the sole stockholder of O'Neill Enterprises, and his wife and children. The
policy at issue in Jackson Park was the $250,000 policy on Mr. O'Neill's life. Id. at 813. The
policy had a cash surrender value of $25,715.70. For a definition of cash surrender value see
note 14 infra. The proceeds of the insurance policies were to be applied to the debt of O'Neill
Enterprises only if the sale price of the real estate under the first deed of trust would not
satisfy the corporation's indebtedness to the financiers. 547 F.2d at 814.
" An involuntary bankruptcy proceeding is initiated by a creditor filing a petition in the
bankruptcy court. The creditor petitions the court on behalf of at least two other creditors
whose claims aggregate to $500. Bankruptcy Act § 59b, 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (1970); see
MAcLAcHLMA, supra note 1, at § 40. The creditor's claim must be a provable or definite claim
against the bankrupt's estate. Bankruptcy Act § 59b, 11 U.S.C. § 95 (b) (1970). For a defini-
tion of provable claims see note 69 infra.
12 A bankrupt has the duty under the Bankruptcy Act to prepare a schedule of assets.
The schedule must show the amount and kind of property, the location of the property, and
its monetary value. See Bankruptcy Act § 7a(8), 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(8) (1970); FED. BANKR. R.
108, 402; MAcLACHLAN, supra note 1, at § 44. See generally Berg. v. Hoppe, 352 F.2d 776 (9th
Cir. 1965).
11 The court's opinion indicates that Mr. O'Neill noted on the schedule of assets that the
policies had no cash value. 547 F.2d at 813.
11 The cash surrender value of an insurance policy is the policy's cash value if the
insurance contract was cancelled by the owner. In re Welling, 113 F. 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1902);
see 7 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 32.220 (2d ed. 1961); EPSTEIN, supra note 4,
at 152.
," Fidelity, Philadelphia and Jackson Park entered into an agreement, outside of the
bankruptcy proceeding, in which Jackson Park would be allowed to foreclose on the real
estate. If, at the foreclosure sale, Jackson Park purchased the real estate subject to the first
mortgage, Fidelity and Philadelphia promised to transfer their right to the rents and insur-
ance policies to Jackson Park. This plan was followed and Jackson Park purchased the real
estate at the foreclosure sale. 547 F.2d at 814.
,1 FED. BANKR. R. 608 provides: "[t]he court may. . . approve the abandonment of any
property . . . . If a case is closed without administration of property of the estate that has
been scheduled, the property shall be deemed to have been abandoned with the approval of
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The bankruptcy court's order of abandonment referred to the abandon-
ment of the real estate, but failed to mention the insurance policies. 7 After
the foreclosure sale of the real estate under the second deed of trust, the
trustee filed a petition in the bankruptcy court to recover the cash value
of the insurance policies from Fildelity and Philadelphia.'8 The financiers
contested the petition,'9 arguing that the trustee had abandoned the poli-
cies when the real estate was abandoned. 2 The bankruptcy court held that
the policies remained as assets of the bankrupt's estate. The district court
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
2'
The Fourth Circuit held that Fidelity and Philadelphia had no defense
to the trustee's claim to the insurance policies.? The court found that the
title to the insurance policies vested in the trustee by operation of law,
subject to the security interest of Fidelity and Philadelphia." Under the
terms of the loan agreement24 the policies were to be applied to O'Neill
Enterprises' debt only upon the contingency that the sale price of the real
estate did not satisfy the debt. The court held, however, that the sale of
the real estate under the second deed of trust brought a price sufficient to
satisfy O'Neill Enterprises' debt to Fidelity and Philadelphia.25 Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the satisfaction of the debt owed the finan-
ciers discharged Fidelity's and Philadelphia's security interests in the in-
surance policies.26 This discharge terminated the financiers' power to assert
claims against the policies.?
The Fourth Circuit rejected the financiers' argument that the security
was abandoned when the trustee abandoned the encumbered real estate.
An inference that the security had been abandoned could not be drawn
merely from the real estate abandonment because neither the petition for
abandonment nor the resulting court order referred to the insurance poli-
the court. . . ."; see Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602 (1937); First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater,
196 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1905); MAcLAcwAN, supra note 1, at § 128; Abandonment, supra note
1, at 415.
'7 547 F.2d at 814.
" After property has been abandoned by the trustee, title to the property revests in the
bankrupt subject to any valid security interests. In re Wattley, 62 F.2d 828, 829 (2d Cir. 1933);
Webb v. Raleigh Hardware Co., 54 F.2d 1065, 1067 (4th Cir. 1932); 4A CoLLIER, supra note 1,
at 70.42[4].
" The petition was an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 703 to recover
money retained by creditors of the bankrupt. See FED. BANKR. R. 701(1).
"547 F.2d at 815.
21 Id. at 814.
12 See Id. at 816.
22 Id. at 815. The basis of the trustee's title is set forth in note 3 supra.
24 The terms of the loan agreement are set forth in note 15 supra.
" 547 F.2d at 814. Jackson Park purchased the property subject to the first deed of trust
and thus assumed the debt held by Fidelity and Philadelphia. Id.
21 Id. at 815.
" Id. The agreement with Fidelity and Philadelphia limited Jackson Park's interest in
the insurance policies to that of the financiers. As the financiers' interest was discharged by
the sale of the real estate, Jackson Park's interest in the policies was also extinguished. 547
F.2d at 814.
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cies. 5 The court reasoned further that because the trustee was not aware
of the value of the policies at the time of abandonment and because the
abandonment decision might have been affected had the trustee known of
the value of the policies,n the trustee had not intended to abandon the
collateral insurance policies when the real estate was abandoned.
While abandonment is a method through which a bankruptcy trustee
disposes of encumbered property that has no value to the bankrupt's es-
tate, 3 the preferred abandonment procedure requires a trustee to obtain a
court order authorizing abandonment before he abandons the property.3'
Approval by the bankruptcy court is not mandatory, however, and several
courts have held that obtaining a court order is only one indication of
whether the property actually has been abandoned.32 These courts indicate
that evidence of the trustee's intent concerning disposition of the property3
and his knowledge of the asset 34 should be considered in determining
whether a specific piece of property was abandoned by the trustee.3
In asset abandonment cases where there is not an order of abandon-
ment and where the trustee's knowledge of the existence of the asset is not
an issue, the trustee's intent is a decisive element. Many courts draw
inferences of an intent to abandon from the failure of the trustee to either
assert a claim to the asset or formally request abandonment of the asset
2 Id.
" The Fourth Circuit's opinion indicates that had the trustee known the value of the
policies, the trustee would have applied that value to the first lien indebtedness and accepted
one of the offered bids at the trustee sale. Id. at 814.
A trustee has no duty to accept encumbered property from the bankrupt's estate. First
Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1905); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Tyco Indus., Inc.,
500 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1974); 4A CoLLE, supra note 1, at 70.42. In deciding whether a
specific piece of property should be abandoned, the trustee must exercise practical business
and administrative judgment in concluding that the interests of the estate will be furthered
by abandonment. Abandonment, supra note 1, at 418.
31 Bankruptcy Rule 608 codifies the preferred practice for asset abandonment under the
Bankruptcy Act. Advisory Committee's Note, FED. BANKR. R. 608; 4A COLLIER, supra note 1,
at 70.42[3]. Under the rule, however, assets can be abandoned without a court order. See
note 16 supra.
12 Pierson v. Paris (In re Humeson), 83 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1936); Wood v. Lowe, 39 Cal.
App. 3d 296, 114 Cal.Rptr. 69, 72 (Ct. App. 1974).
3 See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Tyco Indus., Inc., 500 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1974)(intent
not shown by abandonment of related asset); Webb v. Raleigh Hardware Co., 54 F.2d 1065,
1067 (4th Cir. 1932)(intent manifested in abandonment order); In re Yalden, 109 F. Supp.
603, 604 (D. Mass. 1953)(intent shown by trustee's words).
1 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 119 (1905)(abandonment does not
occur if trustee is unaware of existence of asset); Webb v. Raleigh Hardware Co., 54 F.2d 1065,
1067 (4th Cir. 1932)(abandonment occurred where bankrupt had revealed asset to trustee);
Moore v. Slonim, 426 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Conn. 1977)(abandonment precluded by failure
to schedule asset); In re Yalden, 109 F. Supp. 603, 604 (D. Mass. 1953)(abandonment oc-
curred where trustee expressly intended to abandon); In re Malcom, 48 F. Supp. 675, 679
(E.D. Ill. 1943)(abandonment occurred where trustee knew of asset).
3 Wood v. Lowe, 39 Cal.App.3d 296, 114 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (Ct. App. 1974)(abandonment
involves elements of knowledge, intent, and existance of order).
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by the bankruptcy court. At least one court has questioned whether an
inference can be drawn from the trustee's disposition of related assets.
The Third Circuit has held that a trustee does not evidence an intent to
abandon a claim to a chattel insurance fund by abandoning a defense to a
state court action for the price of the chattel .3 The court found that such
an intent could not be inferred from the defense abandonment by the
trustee because the bankrupt's liability in the related action was in no way
linked to its interest in the proceeds of the insurance fund. 9
Many courts, in the absence of an abandonment order explicitly cover-
ing the asset in question, examine the extent of the trustee's knowledge of
the existence and value of the asset in determining whether the trustee
abandoned the asset. The Sixth Circuit has ruled 0 that a bankrupt's claim
was not abandoned by the trustee because the bankrupt had failed to
schedule the claim as an asset of its estate.4' The court held that the claim
remained in the trustee's possession 2 because the doctrine of abandon-
ment had no application to a bankrupt's unscheduled assets of which the
trustee had no knowledge.
4 3
" Mere inaction by the trustee is insufficient to prove abandonment. Inaction, however,
coupled with probative evidence of an intent to abandon may be sufficient to prove abandon-
ment. Webb v. Raleigh Hardware Co., 54 F.2d 1065, 1067 (4th Cir. 1932); In re Yalden, 109
F. Supp. 603, 604 (D. Mass. 1953); ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 424.
1 See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Tyco Indus., Inc., 500 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1974). Tyco involved
a shipment of goods left at a buyer's warehouse which were stolen before the buyer took actual
possession. The buyer refused to pay for the goods and asserted a defense of ineffective
delivery to the seller's state court action for the price of the goods. Before the suit was decided,
the buyer was adjudicated a bankrupt. The trustee decided to abandon the defense of the
suit, and invited the goods' theft insurer to defend the action. After the seller obtained
judgment, he sued the insurance company for the proceeds of the policy on the theory that
the trustee abandoned the insurance fund when he abandoned the defense to the state court
action. The insurer filed an interpleader action in federal court to resolve ownership of the
insurance proceeds. Id. at 656.
11 Id. at 657.
3' Id. at 658. Two unrelated contracts were involved; one contract was between the buyer
and the seller on the sales agreement; the other was between the buyer and the insurer on
the insurance policy. Id.
40 Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1975). Scharmer involved an
assignment by a bankrupt corporation to one of its directors of all property interests, choses
in action, and things of value. After the bankruptcy proceeding ended, the director attempted
to assert the bankrupt's claims against a third party by alleging abandonment even though
the claims were not scheduled. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, holding
that unscheduled assets of a bankrupt cannot be abandoned. Id. at 98. The court directed
the assignee to petition the bankruptcy court to reopen the proceedings and allow the trustee
to decide whether to abandon the claims. Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
4 Id; see First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115 (1905). Lasater involved a bankrupt's
attempt to bring a post-discharge action to seek damages on an unscheduled usury claim.
The Court held that a trustee abandons property only when he knows of the existance of the
asset and then elects not to accept the property. Id. at 119. The bankrupt regains title only
if he schedules the asset and the trustee does not use the asset to satisfy the creditors' claims.
1978]
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The common element in both the Third Circuit's and the Sixth Cir-
cuit's abandonment approach is the attempt to guard against inadvertent
abandonment of assets outside of the court order procedure by requiring
that effective asset abandonment be the product of a knowing and inten-
tional act by the trustee.4 The Third Circuit refused to infer an intent to
abandon from the abandonment of a related asset and the Sixth Circuit
ruled that a trustee must have an adequate knowledge of an asset before
it can be abandoned. While Jackson Park is factually distinguishable from
the Sixth Circuit's decision, because the O'Neill life insurance policy was
scheduled as an asset, the reason supporting a denial of abandonment in
unscheduled asset cases applies in Jackson Park as well. The duty to apply
the assets to satisfy the creditors' claims implies that the trustee should
only abandon assets in circumstances where a knowledgable decision that
the assets have no value to the estate has been made.45 A lack of knowledge
of the value of the asset prevents the trustee from balancing the factors
involved and reaching a decision in the creditors' best interests.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Jackson Park was more analogous to
the Third Circuit's position on the intent element of abandonment. Both-
courts held that the abandonment of a related asset, without other indicia
of intent, failed to prove an abandonment of anything other than the
specified asset."6 The same duty of the trustee to apply the assets to satisfy
the creditors' claims requires that any abandonment be the result of an
intentional disposition of the asset by the trustee, not the result of an
intent incorrectly inferred from a related action.
The holding of Jackson Park that the trustee had not abandoned insur-
ance policies of the bankrupt when real estate was abandoned is not only
consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, but apparently consis-
tent with the terms of the original agreement in Jackson Park.417 At the
conclusion of the dealings between the parties to the loan agreement, the
financiers had received full compensation for the loan. The financiers stood
as secured creditors to the extent of O'Neill Enterprises' collateral and
would have received an amount beyond that intended by the parties4" had
The Supreme Court concluded that the bankrupt had no claim for usury because the trustee
had not abandoned the asset. Id.
" See Webb v. Raleigh Hardware Co., 54 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1932). The Fourth Circuit
allowed the bankrupt in Webb to assert a pre-bankruptcy usury defense to a post-bankruptcy
mortgage foreclosure. The court held that the trustee surrendered the claim to the bankrupt
through inaction because the record reflected that the bankrupt had not concealed the asset
from the trustee and, in fact, was active in aiding the trustee whenever possible. Id. at 1067.
The trustee was assumed to have knowingly and intentionally abandoned the cause of action.
Id. at 1068.
See generally Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg., Co., 525 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1975).
48 Jackson Park Realty Co. v. Williams (In re O'Neill Enterprises), 547 F.2d 812, 813 (4th
Cir. 1977); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Tyco Indus., Inc., 500 F.2d 654, 659 (3d Cir. 1974).
547 F.2d at 815.
48 Id. at 813. The proceeds of the insurance policies were to be applied by the financiers
only if the sale price of the real estate would not satisfy the corporation's indebtedness. Id.
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they retained the cash surrender value of the insurance policies as a result
of abandonment.
Jackson Park does not alter the requirements of abandonment in the
Fourth Circuit. Mere inaction remains insufficient to establish abandon-
ment unless the inaction is strongly probative of the trustee's intent.49
Abandonment must be a knowing and intentional act of the trustee.5 The
most effective way for a trustee or other party to a bankruptcy proceeding
to clarify whether abandonment has occurred is to obtain a court order
which authorizes abandonment and specifically designates the assets to be
abandoned.-'
Assets not abandoned by the trustee are applied to satisfy the claims
of the bankrupt's creditors. These assets may include real or personal
property, causes of action, or claims against debtors for unpaid debts.2
The bankrupt may, however, owe a debt in turn to his debtor or possess a
similar claim against his creditor. In such circumstances, section 68 of the
Bankruptcy Act allows the bankrupt to set-off claims against his creditor,
and the debtor to set-off debts owed him by the bankrupt.5 3 Consequently,
the creditor may file a claim only for the amount by which his claim
exceeds the amount he owes the bankrupt. Conversely, the debtor may be
required to pay into the bankrupt's estate only the amount by which the
bankrupt's claim exceeds the debt owed the debtor.
To be set-off, debts or credits must be both provable" and mutual.
55
Normally an unsecured creditor must await distribution of the bankrupt's
assets for satisfaction of any claim and in turn risk partial payment of his
claim. " A set-off under section 68, however, allows an unsecured debtor-
at 814. The financiers attempted to claim the policies after the debt was satisfied and they
had obtained their full compensation under the loan. Id. at 815-16.
11 See cases cited in note 36 supra.
" 547 F.2d at 815.
, FED. BANKa. R. 608.
52 For a discussion of the administration of the bankrupt's assets see note 4 supra.
Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970), provides:
(a) In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a
bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be setoff
against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid.
(b) A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the
bankrupt which (1) is not provable ... or (2) was purchased by or transferred to
him after the filing ... with a view to such use and with knowledge or notice that
such bankrupt was insolvent or had committed an act of bankruptcy.
See also Morton, Creditor Set-Offs in Business Reorganization and Relief Cases under the
Bankruptcy Act, 50 Am. BANKR. J. 373 (1976).
' For a definition of provable debts or claims see note 69 infra.
For a definition of mutual debts or claims see note 67 infra.
Unsecured creditors normally must await final settlement of all outstanding titles and
liens to the bankrupt's property before the assets can be distributed to satisfy their claims.
Bankruptcy Act § 65a, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970). Therefore, if the assets are insufficient to
pay all claims, the general creditors are paid pro rata out of the asset fund. Id; see
MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 1, at § 301.
19781
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creditor" to avoid this risk by receiving full value for his claim in relation-
ship to the debt which he owes the bankrupt.
In the recent case of Goldstein v. McLean Bank (In re Johnson),5" the
Fourth Circuit held that a creditor's counterclaim was properly asserted
as a set-off to a bankruptcy receiver's claim. 9 In Goldstein, McLean Bank
made a number of loans to investors in a wine import business owned by
Robert Johnson. 0 The bank held notes guaranteed by Johnson and payable
to the investors as security for the loans.' Immediately before an involun-
tary petition in bankruptcy was filed against Johnson, he converted some
of his assets into a cashier's check issued by the bank. 2 After the petition
was filed, Johnson indorsed the check to his attorney who in turn indorsed
the check over to the receiver in bankruptcy. 3 When the receiver presented
the check for payment, the bank refused to accept the check and asserted
a right of set-off based on claims transferred to the bank by assignment
from the investors after the bankruptcy proceedings had started. 4 The
receiver brought a federal court action to collect on the cashier's check 5
and the bank asserted a counterclaim" to set-off the receiver's claim. The
district court allowed the set-off and the court of appeals affirmed.
The respective claims of the bankrupt and the bank were recognized
as mutual" because the bank stood as a debtor on the cashier's check, and
5, For the purpose of this article the term "debtor-creditor" refers to a party who owes
the bankrupt a debt and who also has a claim against the bankrupt's estate.
552 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1075.
*l The bank's loan agreement with Johnson's investors provided that if and when the
bank had reason to fear that the collateral was unsound, the bank had the right to ask the
investors to substitute new collateral or repay the loans. Id.
11 Johnson was involved in a multi-million dollar fraud through his import business. He
converted his assets at the bank into the cashier's check with the apparent intent to abscond
with the money and avoid his creditors. Id. His attempted concealment was an act of bank-
ruptcy which allowed his creditors to initiate involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against
him. Bankruptcy Act §§ 3a(1), b, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (a)(1), (b) (1970).
63 A receiver supervises the bankrupt's estate until a trustee is elected. Bankruptcy Act
§ 2a(3), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(3) (1970). The receiver has powers to protect the creditors' interests
and, upon application, to conduct the bankrupt's business as well as to litigate any matter
which concerns the bankrupt's estate. Id.; FED. BANKR. R. 201; 1 COLLIUER, supra note 1, at
2.24; Hanna, The Receiver in Bankruptcy; An Introduction to Bankruptcy Reform 3 S. CAL.
L. REv. 241 (1930).
552 F.2d at 1075.
This action was independent of the Johnson bankruptcy proceeding and in furtherance
of the receiver's duty to collect all of the bankrupt's assets. See note 63 supra.
66 552 F.2d at 1075. The bank's counterclaim was based on an agreement made between
the bank and Johnson's investors after the bankruptcy proceedings had begun. The agree-
ment provided that the bank would retain full ownership of Johnson's notes while the inves-
tors were credited with the full face value of the notes on their indebtedness to the bank.
67 Mutual debts or credits are claims between the same parties each having claims
against the other. In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 20 F. Supp. 240, 241 (E.D. Ky. 1937); see, e.g.,
Western Tie & Timber Co. v. Brown, 196 U.S. 502 (1905)(set-off improper because creditor
asserted claim arising from individual corporate capacity while debt owed in fiduciary capac-
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as a creditor of the bankrupt on the transferred claims."8 The court then
held that the bank's claims against the bankrupt's estate were provable"
even though the claims had not yet matured. While the bank had no
defense70 to the cashier's check, it asserted the transferred claims as a
counterclaim against the receiver to set-off and negate the bank's debt on
the check.7' The Fourth Circuit held that the bank had a right under the
terms of section 68 to assert a set-off against the receiver.7 1
The set-off provision utilized by the bank in Goldstein is restricted by
the terms of section 68b to prevent abuse by unsecured creditors.7 3 The
restriction requires that a claim may be asserted as a set-off only if it was
not obtained by the creditor with the view to use it as such after the
debtor's insolvency became apparent.74 The Fourth Circuit failed to deal
with this safeguard in its treatment of the set-off in Goldstein. The result-
ing analysis and decision conflicts with the terms.of section 68 and allows
ity); Western Dealer Management, Inc. v. England (In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth
Corp.), 473 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1973)(claims not mutual because credit held in fiduciary
capacity); Bayliss v. Rood (In re W. Va. Indus. Dev. Corp.), 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1970)(set-
off improper where claim arose from fiduciary duty); 4 COLLIR, supra note 1, at 68.04[2.1].
" 552 F.2d at 1076. The Fourth Circuit applied substantive state law to determine the
bank's rights against Johnson on the notes. Id.; see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Even though the claims were transferred after Johnson was adjudicated bankrupt, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the bank as transferee took whatever rights the previous holders had
in the notes. 552 F.2d at 1076; see VA. CODE § 8.3-201 (1965).
"1 Provable debts are debts of the bankrupt's estate including debts of fixed liability,
debts arising from express or implied contracts, and contingent debts. Bankruptcy Act § 63a,
11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 301; see 3A COLL=, supra note 1, at 63.01[2.1];
MACLACHLkN, supra note 1, at §§ 133-149.
The Fourth Circuit evaluated the claims' provability in terms of their liquidity. See 3
COLLER, supra note 1, at 57.15 at 253. See also 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, at 68.11. Because
the claims were for a fixed amount and personally guaranteed by the bankrupt they were
liquid. 552 F.2d at 1077. A personal guarantee of payment establishes the guarantor's liability
on the instrument to the same extent as if he were a comaker. VA. CODE § 8.3-416(1) (1965),
Offical Comment.
1' The receiver argued that the bank's defenses to the cashier's check were limited by
VA. CODE §§ 8.3-305(2), 306(c) (1965). The statutory defenses are the real defenses ascertable
against the holder in due course of an instrument and the personal defenses of failure of
consideration, nonperformance or nondelivery which are ascertable against a holder who is
not a holder in due course. The bank conceded that it had no defense to its obligation under
the check but argued that the set-off doctrine still applied. 552 F.2d at 1077.
71 Id. at 1077-78.
12 See note 53 supra.
" Set-offs must be provable, mutual debts or credits that were not transferred to the
creditor after or within four months of bankruptcy with the purpose of the creditor using the
claim as a set-off and with knowledge of the bankrupt's insolvency. Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11
U.S.C. § 108 (1970). For a definition of provable debts or credits see note 69 supra. For a
definition of mutual debts or credits see note 67 supra. In this manner, the debtors of the
bankrupt are prevented from using claims as set-offs to avoid the equitable distribution of
assets from the bankrupt's estate. See Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 229 U.S. 435, 444 (1913); United States v. Columbia Erection
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 305, 306 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Becker v. Crabb's Trustee, 21 S.W.2d 438,
439 (Ky. 1929).
71 Bankruptcy Act § 68b(2), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) (1970).
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a debtor of the bankrupt to obtain an advantageous position over other
unsecured creditors 5
Section 68b(2)7" defines a group of debtor-creditors who are specifi-
cally denied set-offs in bankruptcy proceedings. That group includes trans-
ferees who obtained their claims with the intent to use the claim as a set-
off to a debt already owed the bankrupt after the bankruptcy proceedings
were initiated. The term "transfer" is defined in the Bankruptcy Act as
including a sale, assignment, pledge, or any mode of disposing of an inter-
est in property.7 7 Goldstein involved claims assigned by Johnson's inves-
tors" to the bank after the bankruptcy proceedings were started. Thus, the
Goldstein transfer was clearly to a transferee" which obtained the claim
after the bankruptcy proceeding had started. Although the Fourth Circuit
never questioned the bank's motives" in the transfer, the most likely rea-
son for the bank's accepting the collateral at face value would seem to be
to enable the bank to set-off the investors' claims against the cashier's
check."
In deciding whether the debtor-creditor obtained his claim after bank-
ruptcy to use it as a set-off against an existing debt, many courts use the
existance of a prior underlying obligation between the debtor-creditor and
the bankrupt to determine the debtor-creditor's intent.2 The Ninth Circuit
For the advantages of the set-off doctrine to an unsecured creditor see note 56 and
accompanying text supra.
76 Bankruptcy Act § 68b(2), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2) (1970). For the text of this section see
note 53 supra.
" Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970); see Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 182 U.S. 438 (1901)("transfer" used in most comprehensive sense in Bankruptcy Act);
Allan v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (In re Commondity Merchants, Inc.), 538 F.2d 1260 (7th
Cir. 1976)("transfer" under Bankruptcy Act is relinquishment of valuable property).
78 552 F.2d at 1075. The individuals who borrowed money from McLean Bank to invest
in the Johnson business received full face value for the Johnson guaranteed collateral. Id.
7, The Fourth Circuit considered the bank to be "at the very least, a transferee of the
... instruments which Johnson ... had personally guaranteed." Id. at 1076.
In discussing the applicability of § 68b to the case, the Fourth Circuit did not inquire
into the bank's motives for procuring the investors' claims. Id. See generally Brief for Appellee
at 57 (appendix), Goldstein v. McLean Bank (In re Johnson), 552 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1977).
1, Cf. Coyle v. Morrisdale Coal Co., 289 F. 429 (2d Cir. 1923)(set-off denied where debtor
purchased claim to extinguish debt owed bankrupt); United States v. Columbia Erection
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 305 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (set-off denied to debtor who purchased claims after
bankruptcy to negate debt owed bankrupt's estate).
62 See Bel Marin Driwall, Inc. v. Grover, 470 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1972)(direct payments
by bankrupt's debtor to bankrupt's creditor made under obligation imposed by California law
was proper set-off); Tucson House Constr. Co. v. Fulford, 378 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1967)(set-
off of payments upon which debtor was only contingently liable made to bankrupt's creditors
denied); Coyle v. Morrisdale Coal Co., 289 F. 429 (2d Cir. 1923)(denying set-off to debtor who
had purchased claim against bankrupt to extinguish debt); In re Agostini Constr. Co., BANR.
L. REP. (CCH) 64,280 (D.R.I. 1970) (payments made by bankrupt's guarantor were properly
asserted as set-off to debts owed bankrupt's estate); United States v. Columbia Erection
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 305 (W.D. Mo. 1955)(denying set-off to debtor of claims purchased after
bankruptcy and intended by debtor to negate debt owed bankrupt's estate); Lowenthal v.
Block, 175 Misc. 472, 22 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1940)(guarantor allowed set-off of
payments made in regular course of business).
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has allowed a set-off of claims acquired after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition where state law obligates the debtor-creditor to assume a portion
of the bankrupt's debts." Because the payments were required by law, the
court held that they were not made by the debtor-creditor with an intent
to later use the payments as a setoff." In another case, however, the Ninth
Circuit denied a set-off to a debtor-creditor who had voluntarily assumed
a bankrupt's debt to a third party creditor.8 5 Since the debtor-creditor
purchased the claim within four months of bankruptcy and because the
debtor-creditor was only contingently liable on the debt owed the third
party, the court denied set-off. The Ninth Circuit refused to permit a set-
off when the claim was deliberately obtained for set-off purposes."
The Fourth Circuit failed to examine the bank's counterclaim in light
of the section 68b(2) set-off criteria after the court determined that the
bank obtained the transferred claims subsequent to the start of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. If the bank had obtained the claims to reduce its
obligation on the cashier's check, application of the set-off doctrine would
violate the terms of section 68b. The bank's set-off would unlawfully ne-
gate, to the detriment of the other bankruptcy creditors," the reciever's
claim on the cashier's check. The Fourth Circuit's decision, by permitting
a debtor outside of the bankruptcy proceedings to assume an unsecured
creditor's claim and use the claim as a set-off, prevents the bankruptcy
receiver from collecting debts owed the bankrupt's estate and allows the
unsecured creditor to receive full value for his claim., This result virtually
83 Bel Matin Driwall, Inc. v. Grover, 470 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1972). Under CAL.CIWL PRO.
CODE § 1185.1(c) (repealed 1971), a general contractor was liable to any subcontractor's
unpaid materialmen or suppliers who were involved in the construction project. In Bel Marin
the bankrupt's debtor, a general contractor, made direct payments to a creditor supplier after
an involuntary petition was filed against the subcontractor. The general contractor sought to
assert such payments as a set-off against a claim for the bankrupt's work on the construction
project. The Ninth Circuit held that while the debtor had acquired the claim within the
prohibited period, he had not done so with a view to use the claim as a set-off but only to be
in compliance with state law. 470 F.2d at 935-36.
S 470 F.2d at 936; see In re Agostini Constr. Co., BANKS. L. REP. (CCH) 64,280 (D.R.I.
1970); Lowenthal v. Block, 175 Misc. 472, 22 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1940).
' Tucson House Constr. Co. v. Fulford, 378 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1967). Tucson involved a
construction contract under which the general contractor was liable for all unpaid claims for
labor and materials furnished on the job. The general contractor, in turn, required the sub-
contractor to post a surety bond for any obligations under the subcontract. After the subcon-
tractor filed a voluntary petition, the general contractor paid some of the outstanding bills
owing the subcontractor's laborers and materialmen, and then asserted the payments as a
set-off against a claim for the bankrupt's work on the project. The Ninth Circuit denied the
set-off because the general contractor was only contingently liable for the bills in the unlikely
event that the bankrupt's surety could not pay the outstanding claims. Id. at 736.
11 Id. at 738; see Coyle v. Morrisdale Coal Co., 289 F. 429 (2d Cir. 1923); United States
v. Columbia Erection Corp., 134 F. Supp. 305 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
" United States v. Columbia Erection Corp., 134 F. Supp. 305, 306 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (the
use of claim purchased after bankruptcy as set-off to existing debt would treat other creditors
of same class unfairly).
" Unsecured creditors must normally await distribution of the bankrupt's estate and
may only then receive partial payment of their claims. See note 56 supra.
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eliminates the exception contained in section 68b(2) from the set-off provi-
sion.
Straight bankruptcy generally requires the distribution of a debtor's
assets to satisfy creditors' claims and allows the debtor to rehabilitate
himself without the burden of his prior indebtedness. "9 The Bankruptcy
Act, however, also provides other means for debtor rehabilitation. A debtor
may petition a bankruptcy court for a Chapter XI arrangement,90 which is
a plan under which the claims of his unsecured creditors will be satisfied. "
Such plans usually allow a debtor to retain control of his assets and to
establish a schedule for the satisfaction of his unsecured creditors' claims
from the earnings, under which the terms of payment are adjusted.
A confirmed arrangement may be revoked or modified by a party if
confirmation was procured by fraud and if the party was unaware of the
fraud at the time of the confirmation.9 2 Upon motion, the bankruptcy court
may reopen the case and conduct a hearing on the allegation of fraud.93 If
the confirmation is then revoked the court has the option to set aside or
modify the tainted arrangement. Alternatively, the party is allowed to
obtain the same relief from the confirmation as a party in an action under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
0 An arrangement proceeding in bankruptcy is a voluntary action initiated by the debtor
in a competent court through the filing of a petition stating that the debtor is insolvent and
setting forth the provisions of a plan to pay unsecured debts. Bankruptcy Act §§ 306(1), 322,
323, 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 722, 723 (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 11-3; see MAcLACHLAN, supra note
1, § 311. With his petition, the debtor must include a schedule of debts and a statement of
his financial affairs. Bankruptcy Act § 324, 11 U.S.C. § 724 (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 11-11.
The plan may provide for equal treatment of unsecured creditors, or it may group individual
debts into classes with treatment according to the class. The plan may also allow the debtor
to engage in specific undertakings or continue his business during the time for the plan.
Bankruptcy Act § 357, 11 U.S.C. § 757 (1970). The bankruptcy court must call for the first
meeting of the creditors within twenty-five to forty days after the petition is filed. Bankruptcy
Act § 334, 11 U.S.C. § 734 (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 11-25. At the meeting, a vote is taken of
those creditors who accept the proposed plan. Bankruptcy Act § 336, 11 U.S.C. § 736 (1970);
FED. BANKR. R. 11-37. If the arrangement plan is accepted by the creditors and confirmed by
the bankruptcy court, the plan binds the debtor and all creditors whether they accepted the
plan or not. Bankruptcy Act § 367, 11 U.S.C. § 767 (1970); see MACLACHLAN, supra note 1, at
§§ 317, 320.
Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
" A bankruptcy court may set aside or modify an arrangement if, upon the application
of the parties in interest filed within six months after an arrangement has been confirmed, it
appears that the arrangement was fraudulently procured and that the petitioner had no
knowledge of such fraud at the time of confirmation. Bankruptcy Act § 386, 11 U.S.C. § 786
(1970); FED. BANKR. R. 11-41; see In re 20546 Corp., 408 F. Supp. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 9
CoLuIER, supra note 1, at T 11.01.
'3 Bankruptcy Act § 386, 11 U.S.C. § 786 (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 11-41.
"1 Relief in bankruptcy cases is coextensive with that granted in civil actions. Bankruptcy
Act § 21k provides that "[iun all proceedings under this Act, the parties in interest shall be
entitled to all rights and remedies granted by the Rules of Civil Procedure. . . ." 11 U.S.C.
§ 44(k) (1970); General Order in Bankruptcy 37; MACLACHLAN, supra note 1, at § 24. See also
7 MooRE's FEDERAL PROCEDURE 60.18[7] (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's];
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Recently, the Fourth Circuit determined whether the availability of
relief under Bankruptcy Act procedures bars relief to parties in an indepen-
dent action in equity to remedy fraud. The court decided in Bizzell v.
Hemingway95 that the separate means of relief available under the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were alternative, non-
exclusive remedies and a party may chose which remedy to pursue. In
Bizzell, a creditor of the bankrupt was fraudulently induced by another
creditor to approve a Chapter XI arrangement." After the arrangement
was confirmed97 by the bankruptcy court and the fraud was discovered,98
the creditor initiated an action, independent of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, to recover for securities fraud and breach of contract.99
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the creditor stood as a judgment bound
party after the arrangement was confirmed by the bankruptcy court.' 0
Thus, the court reasoned, the creditor could be granted relief if the facts
surrounding the arrangement would warrant equitable relief from a final
judgment.'0' The court held that where an attorney's fraud prevents the
creditor from protecting his own interests in the arrangement proceedings
because the attorney's interests are in direct conflict with his own,1'2 a
creditor can rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)101 as a basis for
Kratovil & Werner, Appeals in Bankruptcy: Traps For the Unwary, 8 J. MAR. J, PRAc. Pnoc.
1 (1974); Yarkwich, The Impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Bankruptcy, 29
REF. J. 75 (1955).
Is 548 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1977). Bizzell involved the plaintiff's claims against, and the
bankruptcy arrangement of, Fairco Drugs, Inc. Plaintiff Bizzell, for the sale of his drugstore
to Fairco, received Fairco debentures and a five year employment contract with Fairco. Fairco
subsequently petitioned for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at
507.
" Id. at 506. During the course of the arrangement proceedings Bizzell and another
creditor, defendent Hemingway, were represented by the same attorney. Between themselves,
Hemingway and the attorney agreed to support the arrangement plan with the intention that
after reorganization Hemingway would control Fairco and Bizzell would be excluded. Biz-
zell's support of the arrangement plan was crucial to Hemingway's gaining control of Fairco.
Thus, Bizzell's attorney, in collusion with Hemingway and without revealing the conflict of
interest, convinced Bizzell to agree to the arrangement by incorrectly advising Bizzell that
the arrangement was his sole means of seeking redress. Id. at 507.
' After confirmation until the final decree is entered the bankruptcy court retains juris-
diction over the arrangement to allow or disallow late claims and to supervise the estate.
Bankruptcy Act §§ 369, 372, 11 U.S.C. §§ 769, 772; 9 CoLLIE, supra note 1, at 9.34.
Is After Bizzell discovered the conspiracy, he obtained independent counsel. 548 F.2d at
507.
" Id. at 506.
,01 Id. at 507; see Levy v. Cohen, 199 Cal.2d 165, 172, 561 P.2d 252, 256, 137 Cal. Rptr.
162, 166 (1977)(confirmed arrangement has effect of judgment); MAcLAcHA, supra note 1,
at § 330.
"' Accord, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)(equitable relief necessary to counter
planned and fraudulent scheme); Crosby v. Mills, 413 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1969)(equitable
relief in a Chapter XII arrangement is proper only in unusual and exceptional circumstances).
"12 548 F.2d at 507. Bizzell could have sued Fairco on the securities fraud cause of action
with permission of the bankruptcy court while the arrangement proceeding was pending. Id.;
see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 122 (1942).
"' Rule 60(b) provides for relief of a party from a judgment induced through fraud, and
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filing an independent action to remedy the fraud.' 4 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that while Bankruptcy Act procedure should normally be fol-
lowed in bankruptcy cases involving fraud, the procedure is not an exclu-
sive remedy.' 5
The Fourth Circuit relied on United States v. Throckmorton',6 as sup-
port for the grant of equitable relief from the bankruptcy arrangement.' 7
In Throckmorton the Supreme Court granted equitable relief from a
twenty year old land confirmation suit which was based on a fraudulently
antedated land grant prepared by the prevailing party in the action. The
original judgment was reversed because the Court concluded that fraud
had prevented the unsuccessful party from fully litigating the case.', 8 Ap-
plication of the Throckmorton rationale in Bizzell resulted in the finding
that the involvement of the creditor's attorney in a scheme to gain control
of the bankrupt had prevented the creditor from representation in the
confirmation proceedings.' 9 The court, thus, allowed independent action
to grant the creditor relief."'
While an independent action in equity under Federal Rule 60(b) is a
proper remedy to a judgment obtained through fraud on the court,"' this
remedy may be applied only in situations where equity normally grants
relief."'2 Rule 60(b) relief may be obtained only in extraordinary circum-
stances 3 where the "delicate balance between the sanctity of final judg-
mistake or because of newly discovered evidence. FED. R. CiV. PRO. 60(b).
"1 548 F.2d at 507.
105 Id.
,0" 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
OI The Fourth Circuit relied on Throckmorton in granting equitable relief from a bank-
ruptcy proceeding procured by fraud on the court. 548 F.2d at 507. The Supreme Court,
however, had noted that Throckmorton did not involve fraud on the court. 98 U.S. at 62.
In Id. at 65-66.
'1 An attorney's position as an officer of the court broadens the fraud's effect beyond
injury to a single person to an injury which encompasses the entire court. See Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (circuit courts have power to vacate
judgments when evidence of scheme to defraud court is shown); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MImLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2870 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILER];
Moore & Rodgers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L. J. 623, 679 (1946).
548 F.2d at 508.
S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 239 (1944); FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Note, Attacking Fraudu-
lently Obtained Judgments in the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. REv. 398, 399 (1963). Fraud on
the court is "a scheme to interfere with the judicial machinery performing the task of impar-
tial adjudication . . . ." Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th
Cir. 1976).
,,' The indispensible elements of an independent action to gain equitible relief from a
prior judgment are a valid defense to the original cause of action, fraud, accident or mistake
which negated the benefit of the valid defense, a resulting unjust judgment, the absense of
wrongdoing on the part of the party seeking relief, and the absence of an adequate remedy
at law. National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 F. 593, 599 (8th Cir. 1903); see Bankers
Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970).
"I See, e.g., Horace v. St. Louis Sw. R.R., 489 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1974)(alleged error in
instruction not exceptional circumstance for purposes of granting equitable relief); Crosby v.
Mills, 413 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1969)(determination whether exceptional circumstances ex-
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ments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the incessant com-
mand of the court's conscience that justice be done"'' will be preserved.
Accordingly, most courts refuse to disturb this balance where the aggrieved
party petitions equity to rectify matters remediable at law."5 In such cir-
cumstances, needless collateral litigation and expense are avoided by forc-
ing the burdened party to fully litigate the matter in a single forum before
resorting to equitable relief. Courts have adopted this rule in order to avoid
repeated litigation between the same parties on the same facts."'
The rule discouraging the grant of equitable relief to parties with ade-
quate remedies at law is followed in bankruptcy proceedings. The Tenth
Circuit dealt with such a situation involving a Chapter XII bankruptcy
arrangement."' When confronted with the decision whether ap indepen-
dent action to void a referee's order was proper in lieu of an opportunity
to appeal the order through the Bankruptcy Act provisions, the court ruled
that the better practice was to appeal the order through the Act."8 The
Tenth Circuit held that substituting an independent action for an appeal
could only be allowed in unusual and exceptional cases."' The Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision does not totally deny relief to an aggrieved party, but dis-
courages, however, repeated litigation of the same issues in different for-
ums by restricting the substitution of an independent action for a direct
appeal.'2 '
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Bizzell, however, allowed the creditor
isted deferred to trial court); Stewart Sec. Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 71 F.R.D. 32 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) (failure to take appeal not an exceptional circumstance); WmGHT & Ma.LER, supra
note 109, at § 2868.
"I Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970).
,,5 See, e.g., Winfield Assoc. v. W. L. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1970); Bank-
ers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970); Taft v. Donellan Jerome, Inc.,
407 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1969); National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 F. 593 (8th Cir. 1903);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 128 (1942).
"I See Fan. R. Civ. P. 60(b), Advisory Committee's Comments; Rule 60(b); Survey and
Proposal for General Reform, 60 CAL. L. REv. 531, 533 (1972); Note, The Final Judgment Rule
in the Federal Courts, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 239 (1947); see, e.g., United States v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878).
"' Crosby v. Mills, 413 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1969). A Chapter XII arrangement is a real
property arrangement by persons other than corporations. See MAcLAcHLm, supra note 1, at
§ 310. In Crosby the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that a federal court
has ancillary jurisdiction over a Rule 60(b) independent action for relief from orders rendered
in a bankruptcy proceeding. 413 F.2d at 1276. An independent action could not, however, be
substituted for the review by petition provided by the Bankruptcy Act in other than excep-
tional circumstances. Id. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for a
finding of any special circumstances in light of the need for a prompt and effective determina-
tion of the bankrupt's estate. Id. at 1277.
" Id. at 1275.
" Id. at 1276.
,, See, e.g., Stewart Sec. Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 71 F.R.D. 32 (W.D. Okla.
1976)(equitable relief improper where party failed to appeal); McCormack v. Schlinder (In
re Orbitec Corp.), 392 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)(denied the simultaneous use of direct
appeal and an independent action for relief from bankruptcy judge's ruling); Note, 4 VAND.
L. REv. 338, 339 (1951).
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to maintain an independent action to gain affirmative relief from the par-
ties who had defrauded him in connection with the arrangement proceed-
ings' 2' although he had not exhausted all of his legal remedies. The bank-
ruptcy court retained power under the Bankruptcy Act to allow the credi-
tor to modify the arrangement to achieve a fair plan.2 2 This remedy would
have been limited in that the aggrieved party could not have litigated the
securities fraud claim against the bankrupt or the fraud claim against the
fellow creditor in the bankruptcy court. 23 The Fourth Circuit must have
intended to avoid this limitation by allowing Bizzell equitable relief in
which his claims could be satisfied in a single action. Because both equita-
ble relief and litigation of outside claims involve an action independent of
the bankruptcy proceedings, Bizzell would not have been significantly
prejudiced had he obtained leave of the bankruptcy court before seeking
independent relief. Thus, the creditor's situation in Bizzell cannot be char-
acterized as the exceptional case required in the Tenth Circuit's test before
an independent action is properly asserted.
The departure in Bizzell from the equitable rule discouraging repeated
litigation was unnecessary because Bizzell could have obtained relief with-
out resorting to an independent equitable action. 4 While the Fourth Cir-
cuit's holding may be limited to cases of fraud on the court, Bizzell indi-
cates that the court will no longer place emphasis on the lack of an ade-
quate remedy at law in allowing equitable relief from bankruptcy proceed-
ings.
The Fourth Circuit's recent decisions in bankruptcy cases indicate a
trend toward a flexible application of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
The court in both Goldstein and Bizzell liberally construed the provisions
of the Act. In Goldstein the court allowed a debtor-creditor set-off in direct
conflict with a provision of the Act, and Bizzell, similarily, a creditor
independent equitable relief although a legal remedy was available. In
O'Neill, however, the court determined that the claims of creditors had
already been satisfied. Thus, the recent bankruptcy decisions of the Fourth
Circuit indicate that the court will construe provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act broadly in favor of creditors, but will do so only when necessary to
protect creditors' rights and insure satisfaction of their claims.
J. PETER RICHARDSON
121 548 F.2d at 508.
' A bankruptcy court may set aside or modify an arrangement if it appears that the
arrangement was fraudulently procured and that the petitioner had no knowledge of such
fraud at the time of confirmation. Bankruptcy Act § 386, 11 U.S.C. § 786 (1970); FED. BA .
R. 11-41.
"I The Fourth Circuit ruled that the action against Hemingway was proper because
Fairco's arrangement in the bankruptcy court had no effect on Hemingway's liability to
Bizzell. 548 F.2d at 507.
,' Had Bizzell sought relief under the Bankruptcy Act provisions, he could have peti-
tioned the bankruptcy court for modification of the arrangement under § 386 and for leave
to litigate the securities fraud claim outside of the arrangement proceedings. Bizzell could
then have sued both Fairco and Hemingway in the same forum.
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